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The Organization–Individual Victim Dynamic
This study considers the role of organizations in relation to identity
theft from three perspectives: as a site of identity use (and misuse), as
detectors of identity theft, and ultimately, as a site where a fundamental
social imperative exists to ensure responsible action is taken to address
this form of criminality. Through investigating the organizational–
individual victim dynamic, this article examines how organizations re-
act to the possibilities of identity fraud and draws out the implications
of this for individual consumers in scenarios of identity theft. The evi-
dence presented leads to a critical examination of the issues confront-
ing organizations in seeking to anticipate and respond to these criminal
acts.
Identity theft threatens the very essence of an individual’s sense of self
and his or her capacity to participate in society. The consequences of this
form of criminality are signiﬁcant and wide-ranging, with current assess-
ments of its impacts exceeding billions of dollars each year (Cuganesan
and Lacey 2003; Cabinet Ofﬁce [U.K.] 2002; General Accounting Ofﬁce
[U.S.] 1998, 2002). Available evidence indicates that identity theft is be-
coming increasingly attractive for perpetrators vis-à-vis other forms of
crime. In the United States, for example, identity theft is described as grow-
ing at a rate of 30% per year, with its losses estimated at reaching $8 bil-
lion by 2005 (Supreme Court of the State of Florida 2002). Although im-
proved awareness and reporting may be partially responsible, these trends
are nonetheless of concern to the individual consumer. The loss of funds
and/or other forms of property, a tarnished credit history, and a criminal
record are all potential outcomes for the identity theft victim, with ongo-
ing consequences for the ability to secure employment, obtain goods and
services on credit, travel freely, and participate in the wider society in a
generally unencumbered fashion. In fact, merely seeking to reestablish an
identity can result in ongoing denial of services for the victim, such as ac-
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cess to existing accounts and execution of existing contracts. Investigating
identity theft and the current environment of responses is thus timely.
Although the formulation of identity theft responses is increasingly
dominating the agenda of governments, policy formulators, legislators,
and researchers, often overlooked is the important function of organiza-
tions in enabling and preventing identity theft. As discussed herein, the
role of organizations in relation to identity theft is threefold: as a site of
identity use (and misuse); as detectors of identity theft; and, ultimately, as
a site where a fundamental social imperative exists to ensure responsible
action is taken to address this form of criminality, an imperative based on
the increasingly accepted notion that organizations are responsible for the
long-term well-being and sustainability of the broader community (Exec-
utive Committee of World Business Council for Sustainable Development
2002; Maignan, Hillebrand, and McAlister 2002; Newson 2002). Conse-
quently, it is important to consider organizational initiatives in formulating
holistic policy responses to identity theft.
While focused on issues of identity theft, this article draws from a re-
search program seeking to measure the nature, cost, and extent of the
broader construct of identity fraud. Identity theft involves an individual
falsely representing him- or herself as another real person for some un-
lawful activity (General Accounting Ofﬁce 1998; Identity Theft Assump-
tion and Deterrence Act of 1998 ). In contrast, identity fraud comprises
both the illegal use of a real person’s identity (identity theft) as well as that
of a ﬁctitious identity (Main and Robson 2001; Cabinet Ofﬁce 2002).
Thus, identity theft is a narrower subset of identity fraud. Of importance
are the implications of this for the organizational–individual victim dy-
namic. For the individual consumer to be impacted, the crime must be one
of identity theft. However, organizations can be victims of the misuse of
both real and ﬁctitious identities. As such, organizations develop their pre-
vention, detection, and recovery responses in relation to identity fraud
rather than identity theft speciﬁcally. Thus, in investigating the organiza-
tional–individual victim dynamic, this article examines how organizations
react to the possibilities of identity fraud and draws out the implications of
this for individual consumers in scenarios of identity theft.
In doing so, the article presents a conceptual map of the role organiza-
tions play in identity theft response and provides empirical evidence about
the extent of organizational activities in this regard. The evidence pre-
sented leads to a critical examination of the issues confronting organiza-
tions in seeking to anticipate and respond to these criminal acts. The ar-
ticle concludes with an evaluation of the empirical data in light of the
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observed need for more appropriate, socially responsible, and effective re-
sponses to identity theft by organizations, an evaluation that considers the
individual consumer as a victim and considers the study’s limitations and
future directions for research in this ﬁeld.
Although the results here are based on Australian organizations, it is
contended that the implications are global. Current international concerns
include the issuance of identity documents as in the U.K. (Home Ofﬁce
2003) and the move towards biometrics-containing passports (see, for ex-
ample, the U.S. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
2002). However, any system of identiﬁcation is still reliant on organiza-
tions correctly issuing, securing, and authenticating these documents. Fur-
thermore, organizations face relatively similar pressures (at least in West-
ern economies) that impact their identity theft response, namely resource
availability, the pressure to report growth, and difﬁculties in garnering out-
comes through the judicial system (Gayer 2003; May 2002; Cabinet Ofﬁce
2002). Finally, a number of organizations within the sample have a global
presence. This article thus represents an important step toward under-
standing the role of organizations within the identity theft context and the
impacts upon individual consumer rights internationally.
ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES IN IDENTITY THEFT
Prior research on identity theft has been largely descriptive, enumerat-
ing identity theft cases, often as a precursor to discussions about potential
solutions (see, for example, Givens 2000; Graycar and Smith 2002; Moore
2002; Willox and Regan 2002). An alternative strand of research has con-
sidered the efﬁcacy of legislative penalties towards identity theft (Matej-
kovic and Lahey 2001; May 2002). While important from an awareness-
raising and law reform perspective, signiﬁcant questions remain about the
role of organizations (including government agencies) in both contribut-
ing to and preventing identity theft on behalf of consumers.
Organizations as Sites of Identity Use (and Misuse)
The role of organizations in modern commerce is well established (Sil-
verman 1970). In the provision of goods and services, organizations are
important users of individual identity. For example, prior to commencing
a relationship with an organization, consumers are often required to regis-
ter or “prove” their identity in order to transact with the organization on an
ongoing basis. Similarly, in the post-registration phase, consumers are of-
ten required to “authenticate” their identity when transacting. In sum, or-
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ganizations transact on the basic premise of identity, be it to provide access
to unemployment beneﬁts based upon the presentation of paper-based
identity documentation, or to enable the transfer of funds electronically
through a username and password authentication process. Therefore, or-
ganizations are important sites of identity use, but can also be sites of iden-
tity misuse. This might occur where organizations do not implement sufﬁ-
cient controls to detect stolen identities prior to transacting. Additional
considerations include the ways in which existing customer information is
stored (physically and electronically) and discarded.
Organizations as Detectors
Signiﬁcant periods of time often elapse prior to detection by individual
victims of identity theft (FTC 2003a, 2003b). Indeed, detection of identity
theft by the individual victim often occurs because they have been con-
tacted by the organization where the identity was misused. Through the in-
terrogation of data repositories, organizations are better able than con-
sumers to become aware of suspicious activities and identity theft. For
example, the nonpayment of credit cards or loans in ﬁnancial services, or
mobile phone bills in telecommunications, may act as initial “triggers of
suspicion.” Alternatively, the payout of higher-than-average beneﬁts or
multiple payouts for the same claim may alert insurance or social security
organizations to real or false claims being made by persons other than the
authorized policy holder or eligible recipient. Thus, it can be argued that
organizations are central to the detection of identity theft and the commu-
nication of this to consumers who are victims.
Organizations and the Social Imperative
That organizations need to effect a social responsibility is a widespread
and increasingly accepted notion as exempliﬁed within discourse on cor-
porate social responsibility and triple-bottom line frameworks that mea-
sure corporate performance in ﬁnancial, social, and environmental terms
(Newson 2002; Turner 2001). It is argued that the social and environmen-
tal impacts of an organization’s activities are just as important as its ﬁnan-
cial performance. Many commentators argue that organizations should do
more to discharge their social responsibility (Executive Committee of
World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2002; Maignan,
Hillebrand, and McAlister 2002). Applied to the context of identity theft,
the social imperative suggests that organizations move beyond compliance
with extant regulations to acknowledge wider obligations. Reporting of
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crime and identity theft to law enforcement is relatively low (Common-
wealth of Australia 2000; Cuganesan and Lacey 2003). Furthermore, there
is no requirement that organizations that detect identity theft inform in-
dustry counterparts and other key stakeholders for the purposes of im-
proving practices to mitigate the likelihood of future events impacting in-
dividuals. Fundamentally, such actions may help in cases of repeat and
persistent perpetrators, especially in light of evidence that the deterrence
associated with the misuse of identity theft is insufﬁcient (Cuganesan and
Lacey 2003).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This research is based on 70 interviews of 1–2 hours duration with Aus-
tralian public and private sector organizations. The interviews comprised
two elements: a structured questionnaire for eliciting organizational re-
sponses to issues of identity fraud and identity theft, and an unstructured
discussion on the issues and challenges facing organizations in responding
to these crimes. Details of both elements are provided below following a
discussion of the research sample.
Organizations were selected through the adoption of a risk-based
identity theft prioritization model. Two key dimensions were considered:
(1) the incentives of perpetrators to attack, and (2) the organization’s scale
and scope of operations. Firstly, existing data on the prevalence of identity
theft were used to a priori select industries for participation that repre-
sented the highest risks for individual consumers (refer to Federal Trade
Commission 2003a). However, within most industries selected, there was
heterogeneity in scale and scope (for example, national versus regional
operations and diverse product ranges versus narrow offerings). Conse-
quently, organizations that represented the diversity within each of the se-
lected industries were targeted.
As such, the sample is intentionally nonrandom, reﬂecting those organ-
izations that collect and disburse sizable ﬁnancial beneﬁts and other goods
and services, and that rely upon identity registration and authentication in
this process. It is not representative of the entire Australian business land-
scape. Rather, it focuses upon those areas that represent the highest iden-
tity theft risk to individual consumers. In all, 70 of Australia’s larger orga-
nizations provided information and data about identity fraud and identity
theft as presented in Table 1.
The targeted participants were each organization’s Fraud Head of De-
partment (or equivalent). Where appropriate, a 5-point Likert scale was
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used to capture survey responses. The structured questionnaire elicited re-
sponses on the following:
• the conduct of risk assessments
• training and other awareness-raising programs
• validation and other preventative techniques
• detection programs
• investigation frequency
• passage of information (internally and externally)
• reporting of occurrences
Subsequent to the questionnaire, a discussion of the issues faced by or-
ganizations in responding to identity theft was conducted. This was de-
signed to elicit issues at three main levels: systemic factors such as legis-
lation and responses from law enforcement; industry factors such as the
volume of transactions that impinge on detection efforts; and organiza-
tional factors such as resource availability and the internal acceptance of
the need for improved controls. The results of the questionnaire are pre-
sented and analyzed ﬁrst, followed by a discussion of the issues and chal-
lenges confronting organizations in responding in the interest of the indi-
vidual victims of identity theft.
RESULTS
Organizations as the Site of Identity Use (and Misuse)
To assess the extent to which organizations discharge their responsi-
bilities given the potential for identity misuse, the research evaluated the
(1) uptake and frequency of risk appraisals and assessments; (2) degree of
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TABLE 1
Sample Demographic by Industry
Number of Percentage of 
Respondent Classiﬁcation Respondents Respondents
Financial services 30 43%
Communication and infrastructure 14 20%
General and health insurance 11 16%
Retail 2 3%
Government organizations 10 14%
Other organizations 3 4%
Total 70
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internal awareness raising; and (3) the nature and extent of preventative ac-
tions, processes, and controls.
Figure 1 reveals the frequency of identity theft-related risk assessments
conducted by organizations and indicates the performance of such tasks on
an annual or semiannual basis for the majority of participants. In fact, most
of these assessments were the result of a risk assessment towards some
other objective. For example, ﬁnancial services institutions would perform
risk assessments on online business, investigating, inter alia, hacking risks
and the risks associated with checking credit histories in a real-time fash-
ion. Similarly, a number of government organizations providing beneﬁts
and services were concerned with the risk of ineligible clients rather than
identity theft per se. While not focused on identity theft, these risk assess-
ments did indirectly consider identity theft and its organizational impacts.
Upon examining the extent of identity theft-related training of staff,
most participants only conducted identity theft-related training during
staff induction or not at all, as indicated in Figure 2. A small proportion
claimed to provide frequent staff training on identity-related issues. Again,
this was more prevalent in industries where the collection of identity doc-
umentation prior to transacting was a legislative requirement.
The converse trend appeared when evaluating awareness raising, as de-
picted in Figure 3. Over half the respondents raised awareness continu-
ously or frequently, such as after every major identity theft event. In part,
these results indicate that participants sought to supplement the absence of
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FIGURE 1
Frequency of Identity Theft-Related Risk Assessments
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more routine training with ongoing alerts on the latest identity theft threats
and manifestations. Issues for organizations included cost and availability
of dedicated identity theft or fraud training programs, and the beneﬁts of
such training given high staff turnover levels in some industries and the ex-
tent to which existing business processes could be reconﬁgured to reﬂect
increased identity theft competencies of staff.
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FIGURE 2
Extent of Identity Theft-Related Training Conducted by Organizations
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FIGURE 3
Extent of Identity Theft-Related Awareness Activities Within Each Organization
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The ﬁnal area of consideration in assessing the organizations’ protec-
tion against identity misuse involves the controls in place when transacting
with existing and new customers. As Figure 4 depicts, the most common
forms of controls and processes include visual inspection of identity doc-
uments and tokens, such as birth certiﬁcates and driver’s licenses. Some
organizations indicated during discussions that certiﬁed, faxed, and photo-
copied documents and tokens were also acceptable, thus increasing the
susceptibility to forgery.
The other most common type of preventative control involved the use 
of technologies to match identifying information against internal sources.
The increase in validation services offered concurrently with the com-
moditization of identity information has resulted in increased data match-
ing and veriﬁcation processes among participants. Figure 4 also indicates
that such processes are predominantly performed using existing internal
databases, rather than those offered by identity brokers. However, discus-
sions with participants indicated a strong intent to pursue external data val-
idation options.
Organizations as Detectors of Identity Fraud and Identity Theft
In assessing the role of organizations as detectors, this research consid-
ers the nature and use of processes and controls used to identify anomalous
events, and whether organizations investigated these further, along with
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FIGURE 4
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the level of internal data capture. As with prevention controls and pro-
cesses, organizations as detectors implemented various physical and auto-
mated processes in seeking to identify and respond to anomalies or suspi-
cious indicators. These included software analysis of transaction activities
and database cleansing by external organizations.
Figure 5 provides an interesting comparison to the prevention activities
performed by participants (Figure 4). It indicates that a greater uptake of
data matching and cleansing is performed with external organizations af-
ter the transaction, as opposed to before. To gain further understanding 
of the likely reaction to these activities, participants were asked to indicate
what percentage of the suspicious events and identiﬁers they chose to in-
vestigate. Surprisingly, 71% of respondents indicated that they investigate
between 76% and 100% of all suspicious identity theft-related events.
However, a further investigation revealed for the majority that this equated
to making telephone inquiries only.
The empirical evidence presented points toward a high uptake of pre-
vention activities, evidence of cross-referencing after the ensuing transac-
tion, and follow-up investigatory work performed to establish whether an
identity theft occurrence is the reason behind raised suspicions. This be-
gins to paint a positive picture of the extent and levels of anticipatory activ-
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FIGURE 5
Participant Use of Detection Processes and Controls
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ities performed by Australian organizations. Further consideration, how-
ever, is required of the discharge of broader social responsibilities.
Organizations and the Social Imperative
In assessing the acknowledgment and discharge of wider obligations,
we considered the level at which organizations reported events to law en-
forcement authorities. As a victim, organizations may choose to write 
off the amount lost or seek to recover it through the use of third-party debt
collectors. Indeed, these may be preferred alternatives based on cost-
efﬁciency criteria and the notion that actions through the judicial system
may be cumbersome and resource intensive and not yield outcomes in a
timely fashion (Gayer 2003). Nonreporting may also occur due to percep-
tions that the admittance of identity theft occurring may adversely impact
the organization’s reputation (refer to Gal-Or and Ghose 2003, for similar
arguments in relation to electronic crime). However, reporting to law en-
forcement facilitates the formal restorative processes for the individual
victims as well as likely deterrence for perpetrators, and is hence reﬂective
of wider societal obligations.
Providing some assessment of the discharge of the social imperative is
the summary of results presented in Figure 6. These results suggest that
while a clear majority of organizations within the sample indicated that
between 76% and 100% of known or suspected identity theft or related
fraud events were investigated by the organization (or outsourced to a third
party for investigation), most of the events deemed to be identity theft or
related fraud were not subsequently reported to law enforcement. When
the total number of events detected was compared to the total number of
events reported, a clear preference away from pursuing matters through 
the engagement of law enforcement and the judicial system is evident. In
all, approximately 9% of the total detected identity theft and related fraud
events provided by the sample were revealed by participants to have been
reported to law enforcement.
These ﬁndings raise serious issues about the organization–individual
victim dynamic of identity theft. The data collected indicates that, in seek-
ing to reestablish their identities and gain judicial restoration, individual
victims of identity theft are without the assistance of organizations. The
extent to which these same organizations chose to inform known identity
theft victims was not pursued.
In addition to the paucity of identity theft and related fraud reporting by
organizations to law enforcement, less than half the sample indicated re-
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ceiving identity theft-related information frequently, either on a formal or
informal basis. Consequently, the extent of data capture and the ability to
draw from the statistics generated on identity theft-related events experi-
enced by the organizations limits the ability to learn from these events,
seek to improve existing controls and processes, and ultimately, inform
others dependent upon their documents, such as bank and utility state-
ments. The following section explores possible reasons and inﬂuences in
seeking to provide some context to the results presented.
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Both internal and external inﬂuences exist that place pressure on the ex-
tent to which organizational victims act in response to identity theft events.
Several issues and challenges exist that need further consideration in un-
derstanding the nature of organizational response to identity theft. These
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FIGURE 6
Percentage of Identity Theft-Related Events Investigated and 
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can be both internal and external in nature, such as resource constraints,
the nature and competitiveness of the industry, anticipated and likely re-
sponse from law enforcement, and the complexity of understanding and
applying privacy frameworks.
A Lack of Resourcing
Like their international counterparts, Australian organizations rely
upon their internal fraud groups to detect, investigate, and respond to iden-
tity theft occurrences. These groups in most cases are not well resourced,
act in a support capacity, and on occasion are secondary considerations for
input into changing processes, capabilities, and product and service offer-
ings. For example, within the communications and infrastructure sector,
the median number of fraud analysts (including managers) totaled three
people, with an average of 65% of their time spent on identity theft-related
work. Also of interest was the number of identity fraud and identity theft-
related events per fraud employee. For this industry it was determined on
average to be 395 detected events per fraud employee, reﬂecting the de-
mands confronting these fraud groups.
Inﬂuencing this lack of reporting may be the relatively minimal re-
sources being contributed to reacting to, and potentially learning from,
these events when compared with what is being consumed in anticipation
of identity theft and fraud. In fact, a cycle begins to emerge whereby or-
ganizations may implement controls and processes in anticipation of iden-
tity theft and fraud, but fail to adequately consider investigating and react-
ing to events subsequently detected. These observations indicate that the
controls and processes employed by the majority of these organizations
fail to evolve due to an absence of dedicated attention to exploring how
criminals managed to exploit weaknesses and countercontrols.
Growth and Efﬁciency Imperatives
The in-depth interviews revealed other internal inﬂuences that impact
responses to identity theft. For example, marketing and sales departments
would often offer lucrative incentives to transact or propose channel mi-
gration initiatives that would enhance transacting convenience—failing to
understand the opportunities this could afford perpetrators of identity theft
and fraud. Similarly, debt collection teams often wrote off bad debts with-
out further enquiry as to the causes and without the involvement of fraud
groups. This ultimately resulted in a portion of “undetected” identity theft
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and fraud, and therefore, a lack of understanding about the real risks to pro-
cesses, products, and services. For organizations, such outcomes are re-
garded as “cost-efﬁcient,” as highlighted in the situation of writing off un-
paid credit card or mobile phone bills.
Competitive Pressures
The survey design and sampling methodology sought to engage indus-
tries that offered products and services of high liquidity that were acces-
sible to identity theft and fraud perpetrators. It became apparent that in-
dustries that suffered the most events and subsequent losses were often
highly competitive (such as telecommunications and ﬁnancial services),
characteristic of a high-volume–low-value transactional environment.
Participants revealed that they simply were not supported through resourc-
ing to react to every event.
Inadequate Law Enforcement Response
A number of issues were raised by participants about the lack of report-
ing of identity fraud and theft events to law enforcement. Firstly, most or-
ganizations thought that law enforcement response was inadequate. The
time from reporting the identity theft or fraud, to the time of law enforce-
ment investigation, subsequent prosecution, and outcome, was considered
to be greater than 18 months by some participants. Secondly, organizations
believed that the onus of collecting case briefs, interviews, witness and
perpetrator statements, and other investigatory processes was on the orga-
nization, not law enforcement, consequently adding to the cost of the iden-
tity theft. Some participants stated that law enforcement would require a
monetary fee to support additional investigations staff. In return, organi-
zational victims would seek to sell information to authorities relating to
particular events to assist them in other matters. The extent of these prac-
tices still remains unclear, but nevertheless indicates that the resourcing
pressures evident with organizational victims is also applicable to law en-
forcement agencies.
The Unclear Impact of Privacy Legislation
Varying degrees of understanding about issues surrounding privacy and
identity fraud were encountered among participants. Operationally, some
participants had developed arrangements whereby information sharing
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about fraudulent identities was in place, reﬂecting their understanding and
consideration of these issues. Evidence from participants indicated great
diversity in the interpretation of the current privacy framework. A long de-
bate surrounds the notion that privacy and control imposition are compet-
ing prospects. This has yet to be tested. The advent of biometric technolo-
gies, the extent to which organizations impose “know your customer”
controls, and the provision of clear and direct guidance on privacy are all
key issues requiring further exploration.
The above issues and challenges raise important questions for regula-
tory and public policy debate. Legislative introduction is one of the preva-
lent forms of change experienced in recent years in seeking to respond to
the growing concerns about identity theft and identity fraud among West-
ern countries. This type of change has manifested in diverse ways, includ-
ing amendments to prescriptive legislation concerning the documents or-
ganizations must rely upon when verifying identities prior to transacting
(e.g., the USA Patriot Act 2001; the Financial Transaction Reports Act
1988 [Australia]), in addition to the more obvious creation of speciﬁc of-
fense categories (e.g., the Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of
1998 [U.S.]). However, to date little is known about the impact of these
legislative solutions, if any, in furthering organizational action on behalf of
the interests of the individual consumer.
In fact, not only has the prescription of legislation and other regula-
tory impositions on organizations received little attention in both popular
and scholarly work, so too has the analysis of the efﬁcacy of measures put
in place by policy makers in seeking to aid both organizational and indi-
vidual victims of identity theft. In the absence of historical benchmarks
both within Australia and overseas, it remains difﬁcult to evaluate the
effectiveness of such response measures. In the United States, as in the
United Kingdom, Canada, Singapore, and a growing number of other
countries, telephone line response centers, common afﬁdavit and docu-
mentation frameworks, and the provisioning of speciﬁc identity theft of-
fense categories, are beginning to emerge to assist organizations in pro-
viding identity theft victims with information on procedures that can help
to reestablish their identity. However, where countries do have these mea-
sures currently in place, the goal appears to be one of improved informa-
tion capture (see GAO 2002), rather than the evaluation of whether these
mechanisms are both efﬁcient and effective from the perspectives of the
organizational victim and individual victim.
Although this study is unique in that it presents issues related to iden-
tity theft and, more generally, identity fraud from an organizational per-
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spective, it also highlights the void in current research that seeks to iden-
tify synergies between proﬁt-oriented action by organizations that in turn
promotes identity theft mitigation—in other words, a common ground by
which organizations can continue to strive for proﬁts and other organiza-
tional goals, while simultaneously reducing the risk of identity theft oc-
curring to their customers. To this end, great potential exists for future re-
search to explore ways in which organizational strategy, such as Customer
Relationship Management (CRM), can result in the achievement of so-
cially responsible actions, such as identity theft mitigation, while main-
taining an organization’s overall aims of sales growth and, ultimately,
proﬁt gain. The extent to which organizations can reduce the incidence of
being sites of misuse, and as it seems from the data, inaction, by applying
theories and strategies that translate into individual consumer protection,
requires a deeper understanding of each organization and the environment
in which it operates. Contributing to this understanding would neverthe-
less help to inform debate as to the measures that organizations could
adopt in seeking to mitigate the risk to the consumer.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The data analysis and discussion indicates that ensuring a responsible
organizational response to identity theft and fraud for individual victims is
complicated by many internal and external inﬂuences. Empirically the
data provided reveal resource constraints, a lack of process and capability
testing, and the predominance of activities performed in anticipation of
identity theft and fraud. However, it was also revealed that shortcomings
existed in the resourcing of those activities in reaction to identity theft- and
fraud-related events, the paucity of reporting of events to law enforcement,
and the subsequent moves towards identity theft and fraud commoditiza-
tion. In all, the evidence obtained raises serious questions about the ade-
quacy of response for individual victims in Australia, which can be applied
on a global scale to organizations confronted by identity theft. Organi-
zations are an inseparable part of identity theft, acting as users (and mis-
users), detectors and communicators, and consequently, possessors of an
opportunity to act responsibly, which to a great extent has been overlooked
by previous research.
In interpreting and generalizing the results of this article, its limitations
must be considered. First, the survey is intentionally nonrandom, being fo-
cused on those industries that represent the highest identity theft risk for
individual consumers. Within selected industries, however, the use of an
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interview-based research method necessarily limited coverage of the pop-
ulation of organizations. While the targeting of research participants was
based on ensuring the representativeness each industry’s diversity, this re-
mains a limitation to the generalizability of the results. A second limitation
involves the unwillingness of participants to provide information on their
actual response to identity theft where it may portray their organization in
an unfavorable light or reveal sensitive information. While assurances of
conﬁdentiality and anonymity of response were made, respondent bias
represents another risk to the validity of questionnaire and interview re-
sponses. Third, the results are based on observations of Australian organ-
izations. While there is much to suggest that these issues transcend na-
tional and geographic boundaries, the extent to which they do so represents
an area for further research internationally.
In sum, this article has provided evidence of the extent of organizational
response to identity theft and fraud in Australia. As a consequence, a num-
ber of serious challenges to and pressures on organizations were identiﬁed.
Addressing these requires consideration and assistance from other stake-
holders, namely governments, industry bodies, and consumer advocacy
agencies. Undoubtedly, organizations as “partner victims” of identity theft
have an important role to play in supporting individual consumers as vic-
tims of this crime. Without their assistance, an individual victim faces 
the unenviable task of restoring his or her identity with little insights into
how and where it was misused as well as the potential consequences of its
misuse.
In considering how much responsibility and action is required from or-
ganizations as “stewards” of the identity of individual consumers, a num-
ber of important questions remain unanswered, as have been identiﬁed
herein. Researchers can play an important role in identifying innovative
approaches to measuring the performance of identity theft responses that
already exist (or are beginning to emerge) in other ﬁelds, such as CRM,
performance management, criminology, and the social sciences. The ap-
plication of these will help to address the current and emerging challenge
of assessing the effectiveness of identity theft response—the next step in
understanding the organization–individual victim dynamic.
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